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1  Introduction 
 
Performance measurement is still on the rise. According to Power (1994, 1997), modern welfare 
states are developing into “audit societies”. In the same vein, Strathern (2000) argued that audit 
regimes have become the moral fabric of modern society. Both scholars feel that new public 
management (NPM) has furthered a culture of accountability by promoting “styles of governance 
which commonly presuppose the necessity and benefits of auditing in its various forms” (Power 
1994: 143). Indeed, empirical evidence for the rise of audit systems, including all sorts of 
performance measurement tools, is overwhelming. Simultaneously, many scholars have shown 
how performance measurement can give rise to serious complications, in the shape of technical 
problems and all kinds of “diseases” and unintended consequences (cf. Bouckaert, 1995; Van 
Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). In this type of analysis, problems and solutions generally focus on 
improving our understanding of the information asymmetries involved in performance 
measurement. Such reasoning draws on institutional economics, claiming that the risks involved 
in principal-agent relationships (such as opportunistic behaviour and moral hazard) can be kept in 
check through rational strategies on the part of the principal.  
 
We would argue, though, that a singular focus on information asymmetries may disregard the 
fundamental causes of failures in performance measurement. This is because it is based on the 
theoretical assumption of a singular, stable principal-agent relationship. However, many 
governance systems lack such a clear and stable relationship, and it is that which is at the heart of 
many problems in performance measurement. We will demonstrate this through an analysis of 
developments in four areas in the public domain (provisions for disability, labour reintegration, 
social housing and home care) in which performance measurement has been applied. These cases 
show that an analysis of performance measurement (and its problems) must take account of its 
historical development and position within the governance system: where it originates, what 
functions it has and how different functions are related. If this is omitted, one may be trying to 
solve the wrong type of problem. It is important to stress that such an analysis does not imply a 
rejection of research on information asymmetries; rather, it is an attempt to position this more 
clearly within the broader governance debate.  
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In paragraph two we will explain our approach to the analysis of performance measurement 
problems in more detail. Next, the four cases will be presented in paragraphs three through six, 
respectively provisions for the disabled, labour reintegration, social housing and home care. This 
will be followed by a comparative analysis and conclusion in paragraph seven.  
 
2 Performance measurement and governance  
 
In the public sector, the ideas from the NPM school put the issue of performance measurement on 
the agenda of institutional reform. Osborne and Gaebler, for instance, have argued that 
“measuring results” is a neglected field in the Weberian, input-based model of public 
administration. “If you don’t measure results, you can’t tell success from failure, and if you can’t 
reward success, you’re probably rewarding failure” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). There are 
various settings in which performance measurement has been applied. First, there is the typical 
situation in which (decentralised or “autonomised”) agencies perform public tasks, accounted for 
by means of “realised output”. Second, public tasks may be performed by a so-called “quasi-
market”, in which private providers compete for clients or the custom of collective purchasers 
(Brandsen, 2004). Often, these quasi-markets lack adequate information on quality and prices, 
which means that performance measurement may be a necessary precondition for the well-
functioning of the market (cf. LeGrand and Bartlett, 1993). Finally, public governance 
increasingly involves hybrid (public-private) organisational networks, in which public services 
are co-produced. Since such networks are not embedded in the traditional systems of political 
control, performance measurement tools become part of efforts to encourage different types of 
accountability. 
 
Like anything in life, performance measurement does not always work as one would like, and 
many authors have addressed the problems. In such literature on the “diseases” and unintended 
consequences, the focus is largely on the behaviour of organisational actors and their reactions to 
incentives connected to the various measurement instruments. For instance, public agencies may 
stop investing in aspects of their work which are no longer rewarding in terms of new output 
indicators, or try to withhold information potentially damaging to their reputation. Information is 
the central concept here, implying that the key to controlling performance is to know the facts of 
it. When framed in terms of a principal-agent relationship, attention is often focused on 
information asymmetries: the agent often has more information about actual practice (the facts) 
than his principal, which allows the former to manipulate assessments of performance.  
 
Although this type of explanation certainly covers some of the failures of performance 
measurement, its explanatory potential is intrinsically hampered by the way in which it conceives 
of the principal-agent relationship. To clarify this, it is important to distinguish between the 
conceptual and the normative use of the principal-agent notion. Conceptually, it is a perspective 
that presupposes a certain type of relationship between actors. Although limited by its bilateral 
focus, it is essentially neutral: theoretically, the roles could be attributed to any empirical actor, 
and any actor can be both principal and agent in certain respects. When used normatively, 
though, the notion implies that the relationship between two empirically identified actors should 
be one of principal and agent, in other words, of hierarchy. In many studies on performance 
measurement, the conceptual and the normative have become tangled up: the principal-agent 
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notion is used as a perspective to analyse failures, but with the implicit assumption that 
government must be the principal, who controls the other actors involved in public service 
provision. The nature of this relationship is not questioned, which, reflecting back unto the 
conceptual notion, means that roles are fixed and the relationship is stable. The consequence is 
that explanations for failure are only examined from within such a specifically defined 
relationship, and are not extended to the relationship itself.  
 
Yet many governance systems lack the clarity that such an approach supposes. Whether desirable 
or not, many of the quasi-markets and networks mentioned above are characterised by multiple 
and ambiguous relationships, where it is not clear who is agent or principal, and where the nature 
of the relationship is contested. For example, service providers may feel that government’s 
attempts at control overstep the bounds of legitimacy; in other words, that it is less of a principal 
than it tries to be. The analysis of performance measurement tools cannot be isolated from such a 
context. When actors have no consensus on the nature of their mutual relationship, they may have 
different views of what performance measurement means. To clarify this, we will identify four 
potential functions.  
 
Given that the principal-agent notion implies hierarchy, ambiguity at least partially concerns 
uncertainty about the level of coercion that public authorities can legitimately exercise. On a 
scale of rising coercion, De Bruin (2002) distinguishes four functions of performance 
measurement. Respectively, performance measurement can contribute to: 
 
(a) Transparency: other actors are informed about the nature of performance; 
(b) Organisational learning: transparency creates opportunities for a debate on quality, in terms 
of procedures, products and services; 
(c) Assessment: measurement allows evidence-based judgement on the quality of performance; 
(d) Sanctioning: assessment is tied to binding decisions with respect to budgets, continuation of 
contracts and so on. 
 
Some functions can only be fulfilled under specific institutional (governmental) conditions. For 
instance, the function of sanctioning presupposes a multi-layered governance system rooted in an 
undisputed, legitimate distribution of authority. However, the nature of governance and the (use 
of) performance measurement tools are not necessarily well-aligned. To demonstrate this, we 
have selected four empirical cases along the following two dimensions: 
 
• Is the governance system in question based on clear principles, or characterised by 
ambiguity? 
• Have performance measurement tools been deliberately designed as part of the governance 
system, or have they developed in a spontaneous process? 
 
This has resulted in four cases, which can be characterised as follows: 
 
1. Well-designed governance +  public control over performance measurement  
 
Case: Decentralisation of service provision for disabled people.  
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The analysis will show what happens when the actors involved challenge the legitimacy of the 
underlying governance system.  
 
2. Ambiguous governance +/ public control over performance measurement   
Case: Private provision of labour reintegration tasks.  
This case demonstrates how the need for performance measurement tools increases in a context 
of opaque and hybrid  governance, whereas this context itself impedes effective implementation 
of such tools.  
 
3. Ambiguous governance  + absence of performance measurement regulation 
Case: Quasi-market in social housing.  
The case shows that this has caused a situation in which several actors have developed 
performance measurement tools of their own, which stand in an unclear, overlapping and even 
conflicting relationship.  
 
4. Well-designed governance + absence of performance measurement regulation 
Case: Introduction of a quasi-market for home-care delivery.  
The case shows how a lack of transparency regarding public funding provokes a need for 
performance measurement, which turn from an instrument of accountability into a tool for 
inciting organisational learning.  
 
In the following paragraphs, the four cases will be analysed at greater length. In each case, the 
analysis will focus on the governance structure, the nature of performance measurement and its 
problems, the (intended and actual) functions of performance measurement, and finally, the 
relationship between governance and performance measurement. It will become clear that the 
actual functions of performance measurement often differ from its manifest ones, which means 
that an analysis of its problems must also necessarily shift.  
 
 
3 Provisions for disabled persons: the renegotiation of governance 
 
Introduction 
In the Netherlands, the provision of facilities, such as wheelchairs, for disabled persons is 
considered to be a public service. In order to keep costs down and enable adaptation to local 
circumstances, central government decentralized the responsibility for provision in 1994. Since 
then the provision is arranged in a Framework Act, in which municipalities are held responsible 
for policy making concerning disabled persons in their community and the distribution of 
facilities (Provision for Disabled Persons Act1, article 2).  
 
Along with decentralization and deregulation, municipalities also assumed financial 
responsibility, meaning that the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports allocates an annual 
budget to municipalities. The Ministry is not concerned as to how a municipality spends the 
budget as long as it administers the facilities on a minimal level, as defined by the Act. 
Municipalities are permitted to use any budget surplus for other purposes; however, other 
municipal resources bear the costs in the case of a deficit. In this way, municipalities have an 
incentive to work efficiently.  
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The Ministry monitors the administration by performance measurement tools. It will be shown 
that these tools suit the governance system. Therefore at first glance performance measurement 
seems to work well. However, some problems regarding the performance measurements arise. 
Although these problems seem to be classic NPM problems, evidence indicates that discontent 
over (the evolution of) the governance system could be the major cause. In this way performance 
measurement fulfils another, unintended function, namely as a means to renegotiate the 
governance system.    
  
Well-considered governance system 
The Framework Act came into effect after an intensive debate about the governance system. The 
parties involved agreed upon a well-considered system, in which the responsibility for policy 
formulation and implementation lies within a municipality. It is assumed that the democratically 
chosen city council and an advisory board of clients monitor these tasks, while the mayor, 
aldermen and bureaucrats are held responsible for the execution. In this way the Ministry aims at 
horizontal accounting within a municipality instead of hierarchical or vertical accounting 
between the Ministry and a municipality (RMO, 2002: 34). The only external control is through 
Courts, which are supposed to ensure a minimal level of service provision in individual cases, 
based on the Framework Act (House of Parliaments, 1993: memorandum of understanding).  
 
The responsibility for the Ministry is limited to the maintenance of the system. Its main activities 
are to ensure a sufficient macro-budget2 and to formulate fair distributive criteria. In order to 
fulfil these tasks, the Ministry requires information about the services delivered and costs 
involved. For example, the Ministry regularly investigates if the macro-budget is adequate, for 
this purpose it needs information about municipal costs. In the case of an inadequate macro-
budget, it examines the causes of the deficit. If causes can be found within municipal policies and 
implementations, municipalities are held responsible. However, in case external causes can be 
identified, like the increase of prices for facilities or a growth in the number of recipients, the 
ministry is expected to increase the macro-budget, as it did in 2000 (Ipso Facto and SGBO, 2001: 
22). Thus, the main contribution of performance measurement, in this case, is transparency.  
 
Public control over performance measurement 
Although municipalities have a large degree of autonomy, they are legally obliged to hand over 
information required by the Ministry (Provision for Disabled Person Act, article 10). The 
Ministry has hired consultants to collect the required information and interpret data of municipal 
performances. The main method of data-collection is an annual scan, which is a questionnaire 
regarding financial and other quantitative indicators3 that municipalities have to complete. These 
data and interpretations are presented in evaluations of the Act (in 1995, 1997 and 2001) and in 
annual overviews of quantitative data. In this manner the Ministry has control over the system of 
performance measurement.  
 
Performance measurement in practice 
Superficially seen, performance measurement in this governance system is a success as it results 
in transparency. After all, the gathered information allows the Ministry to perform its tasks. 
However, if one looks beneath the surface it seems to be a can of worms.  
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The first problem is that organizations representing the interests of disabled persons do not share 
the positive official conclusions about performance. According to the evaluations, the 
performance of municipalities is quite good: they deliver facilities for the disabled at a reasonable 
standard and for a reasonable price. On the other hand, organizations of disabled claim many 
municipalities mess up because they do not provide the services that disabled persons need and 
instead provide cheaper ones in order to keep costs down (Moerkamp, 2000). To strengthen their 
argument, organizations of disabled conduct their own investigations and present their own 
interpretations of the performance measurements results, which are not as positive as the official 
ones (e.g. CG-raad, 2001). The differences in results led to question marks about the impartiality 
of the official conclusions, especially considering one of the hired consultants is in fact an 
associate of the Dutch Society of Municipalities4.  
 
These frictions could be the result of typical NPM performance measurement problems, for 
instance the difficulty of measuring performances because it is hard to present indicators that 
give a realistic idea of municipal service provision. However, some evidence shows that 
disagreement about the legitimacy of the governance system could be the real underlying cause 
of this problem. It appears that municipalities prefer the designed system, in which they have a 
lot of autonomy. Based on the official results, they argue that the Ministry does not have any 
reason to interfere with municipal autonomy or change the governance system. Therefore, the 
official results are of benefit to municipalities. Organizations of disabled plead for a governance 
system in which municipalities are bound to national regulation and the Ministry has an extended 
role. According to them, horizontal accounting is undesirable or at least not enough accounting, 
because it leads to differences between municipalities in legal equality and security. So their not 
so positive results are in favour of their argument. Disputes about the performances seem to veil 
the real problem of disagreement about the governance system. 
 
The second problem is the rising non-cooperative attitude of municipalities toward data-
collection, which makes performance measurement impossible. Although the principal-agent 
relation can also explain non-cooperative attitude of agents, in this case it seems to arise out of 
discontent with the way the governance system develops itself. 
It appears that many representatives of the Lower House support pleas of disabled in favour of 
ministerial interference (e.g. Smits, 2000). Therefore they changed the governance system de 
facto, since they established a comprehensive national protocol in 2002, which reduced 
municipal autonomy considerably. According to many municipalities this change is unacceptable 
because the official results showed they did well. They feel that the data they provided to the 
Ministry are not being used in decisions of the Lower House; consequently some of them are 
unwilling to contribute to the data-collection any longer5. Moreover most municipalities are very 
unsatisfied with this protocol, since they are unsure about how they can be financial responsible 
when they are only seen as executors of policy. Disputes about cooperating or not with 
performance measurements seem to veil the real problem of disagreement about the evolution of 
the governance system.  
 
Politicising of performance measurement  
Failures in the performance measurement can be understood as classical principal-agent 
problems. However, in this case discontent over (the evolution of) the governance system seems 
to be the major reason for problems with performance measurement. Actors in the field seem to 
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use the language of performance measurement and performance measurement problems to 
express their (implicit) objections against the governance system, and to renegotiate the 
institutional responsibilities in that system. Thus, performance measurement is more or less 
politicised and fulfils in this way another, unintended function.  
 
 
4 Labour reintegration: the legitimising aspects of performance measurement  
 
Introduction 
The analysis in this section is based on research into the structure and conduct of a market-based 
system of labour (re)integration policy in the Netherlands( cf. Svensson & Trommel 2003). Until 
recently, a large share of governmental activities in this area was carried out at the municipal 
level by social service organisations and labour exchange agencies. However, in the second half 
of the nineties the Dutch government initiated a major institutional revision in the fields of both 
social security and labour integration, aiming at a more efficient and effective implementation of 
policy. An important element of this operation was the decision to outsource most labour 
reintegration activities.   
 
The analysis focuses on one of the larger cities in the east of the Netherlands (which will here be 
referred to as “Easttown”). Easttown was among the first municipalities introduce the new 
approach to labour reintegration. This happened at the beginning of 2001. We studied the design 
of the new system and its functioning during the first one and a half years.  
 
At the municipal level labour reintegration mainly concerns the group of citizens receiving a 
social assistance benefit. Within this population there are a wide variety of social problems, 
ranging from lack of educational training to social isolation, physical handicaps or severe drugs 
problems. This implies that reintegration plans must be tailored to individual needs. Usually, 
such a plan is based on a first diagnosis, followed by different activities in the area of social 
empowerment, educational training, job searching and the like. Under the new system, the chain 
of necessary activities, -from diagnosis to actual re-entry on the labour market- is refereed to as a 
“reintegration trajectory”. At the beginning of 2001 Easttown hired five private reintegration 
agencies to handle an agreed-upon number of individual “trajectories”. 
 
Our study shows it was extremely difficult to measure the performance of these agencies. 
Beneath we discuss the nature of these problems. It will be shown that specific problems in the 
area of performance measurement are strongly related to aspects of the design of the new system.  
 
Performance measurement: major problems  
At the beginning of 2001 about 1.200 trajectories were outsourced. To be more precise: the social 
policy department of the municipality selected five commercial agencies, which were then 
licensed to handle a fixed number of trajectories (a so-called “package”).  However, the agencies 
did not receive their clients all at once. During the following year, officials from the social 
services department sent clients to the agencies on an individual basis. 
  
So how did the private reintegration agencies perform? As indicated above, it is very hard to 
pronounce sound judgement on this. In our study we found large variance between the agencies 
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with regard to the most important output variable, the share of reintegrated clients. However, 
these findings are highly unreliable, given the following considerations:  
 
I. Selection of clients. We found that municipal consultants (case managers) developed 
specific preferences with respect to their use of the agencies.  This resulted in an 
(implicit) division of labour between the agencies: some dealt especially with the 
complex cases –i.e. clients with the largest distance from the labour market- while others 
were allowed to concentrate on the easiest cases. Therefore, it would be neither fair nor 
valid to judge the agencies merely by output standards.   
II. Interdependencies. For a reintegration agency to be successful, it is very important to 
have good access to municipal resources (client information, use of legal sanctions, 
reintegration instruments etc.). As far as this was concerned, it appeared that some 
agencies had a much better relationship with local officials (c.q. case managers) than their 
competitors, and therefore much better access to resources. 
III. Uncertainty about the workload. While one of the agencies received only 14% of the 
“package” that was agreed upon, another agency received 37%, and yet another one as 
much as 89%. Evidently, the resulting uncertainty prevents agencies from good 
organisational and personnel planning. The more the actual workload deviates from the 
expected one, the more one can expect providers to suffer serious financial problems.  
IV. Lack of reliable data. We found perplexing discrepancies between the data (on 
clients, products, results) delivered by the agencies and those of the municipal 
administration. Although contracts with the agencies included clear arrangements 
regarding data delivery, in practise the municipal department did not enforce the 
implementation of these arrangements or set up an effective administrative system.   
 
In short, the municipal authorities were unable to assess the performance of the agencies under 
contract. This was partly a data-related problem; however, even if adequate data on progress and 
results had been available, it would still have been impossible to make a fair comparison between 
the efforts of the reintegration firms, for the reasons mentioned above. One would need very 
precise knowledge on the selection of clients and the organisation of the work processes within 
the reintegration agencies in order to cast on actual achievements.  The difficulty in measuring 
performance very much relates to the design of the new system, as we shall discuss now. 
 
Managed competition 
Clearly, the new approach to labour integration in Easttown is inspired by a market-oriented 
concept of governance. This new approach aims to introduce “managed competition” or, as Le 
Grand and Bartlett (1993) put it, a quasi-market for the provision of public goods.  The basic 
concept is that public authorities withdraw from the delivery of goods and services and leave 
those tasks, under clearly specified conditions and regulations, to commercial organisations. It is 
important to note that managed competition does not necessarily call for a performance 
measurement system. Theoretically, it is assumed that markets will produce adequate information 




Still, this is not the way it works in Easttown. There seems to be a strong need for performance 
measurement which can be explained from two characteristics of the new institutional design: a) 
the use of so-called  “ block contracts” and b) the importance of the “package-principle”. 
 
Block contracts 
Labour (re)integration is a highly complex product, consisting of a large variety of services, such 
as educational training, psychological counselling and drug rehabilitation programs. 
“Deconstructing” the reintegration trajectory into separately priced and contracted services may 
be a very complicated and costly. Given these high transaction costs, it is understandable that 
Easttown prefers the use of block contracts, which enable the purchase of complete reintegration 
trajectories, leaving a large measure of discretion (with respect to the construction of the 
trajectory) to private providers.  
  
However, such an approach negatively affects both competition and transparency. In fact, 
reintegration agencies become the preferred providers for a whole range of (interlinked) 
activities, which makes it hard to tell if prices reflect actual market conditions. In turn, this will 
increase the need for an ex-post performance assessment. 
 
The “package-principle”    
In a typical market context, clients must be able to select the provider of their choice. The less 
this basic principle is realised, the less providers will be inclined to increase quality and reduce 
costs. Seen from this perspective, Easttown agreements on the number of reintegration cases per 
agency (the “ package”) seem to make no sense, as they contradict the principle of free choice.  
 
Still, there are some arguments to justify this specific design. The precondition for individual 
choice would be that clients are awarded a personal budget, enabling them to act as consumers on 
the reintegration market. Here some serious risks are involved. First, clients might be 
opportunistic in their purchasing behaviour, for instance, if their (silent) ambition is not re-entry 
on the job market but continuation of social assistance benefits. In that case, clients will tend to 
select providers with a poor reputation. Second, providers might try to seduce clients by offering 
services with little relevance to the public aim of labour reintegration. For these reasons, it is no 
surprise that a system based on personal reintegration funds is still controversial within the 
political arena.   
 
However, the result is that local authorities must accept a method of implementation that does not 
produce the disciplining effect one would expect in a typical market-context. Given the time-
consuming character of reintegration services, there is a real danger that poor performance will 
only manifest itself after a considerable period of time. Therefore, the need for interim 
performance assessment increases dramatically.  
 
Managed co-operation 
While the need for a monitoring system increases, local authorities also become increasingly 
aware of the difficulties involved in realising such a system. As we know, performance 
measurement is complex enough for agencies operating at arms’ length from public authorities. 
But reintegration concerns private firms with even more autonomy both in financial and legal 
terms. Why would they make their organisations fully transparent? How reliable are their reports 
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on progress and results? Here, well-known problems with respect to principal-agent relationships 
are likely to be ubiquitous and highly persistent.    
 
In our study, we found that local officials started searching for means of reducing the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of private reintegration agencies. They did this by initiating 
forms of co-operation. This practice first developed at the stage of client-selection. It appeared 
that close relationships developed between municipal case managers on the one hand and (some) 
representatives of reintegration firms on the other hand. Of course, this co-operation may 
encourage the effective assignment of clients, given that case managers acquire knowledge about 
the strengths and weaknesses of the contracted agencies.  However, it may also result in an 
uneven (and/or unfair) distribution of cases. We found evidence for the latter, which meant that 
we could not trust our data on realised output.  
 
Furthermore, several forms of co-operation developed during the implementation of reintegration 
trajectories. During this process, some firms appeared to have much better access to municipal 
resources than others, based on higher levels of trust in dealing with local case managers. Again, 
it is possible that the development of networked co-operation may well contribute to effective 
reintegration, but nonetheless it does not match the logic of fair competition and valid 
performance measurement.  
 
Conclusion  
The design of the market process has major shortcomings. It fails to copy the selective 
mechanisms of the market with respect to quality and price. Potential effects cannot even be 
observed, since poor performance will not show in the conduct of clients. Given the risks 
associated with long-term block contracts and the use of packages, it is no surprise that local case 
managers start investing in co-operative and trust-based relations with private reintegration 
agencies. However, without being too cynical, one could wonder about the surplus value of this 
new practice over the previous, bureaucratic system of policy implementation. In some respects, 
reintegration agencies are increasingly treated as (over-paid?) divisions of the municipal 
organisation…  
  
All in all, one can observe a hybrid situation that gives rise to a strong need for sound 
performance measurement, while simultaneously obstructing the realisation of such a system.  
Above all, the function of performance measurement in this case is that it covers-up failures in 
the governance system while feeding the impression that nonetheless an effective and efficient 
mode of governance has been installed.  
 
 
5 Social housing: hidden confusion over governance 
 
Introduction 
In the Netherlands, the social housing stock has traditionally been in the care of private nonprofit 
providers (for an overview, see Brandsen, 2004; Brandsen and Helderman, 2004). In the postwar 
period, these former charities became closely linked to state housing policy through a complex 
system of subsidies and regulation. They built extensively and became the dominant players in 
the rental market, at present still controlling well over a third of the total housing stock. Many are 
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still fairly small organisations, with a few dozen employees and an average of about three 
thousand homes in their possession. Recently, though, mergers have led to the rise of a number of 
large, nationally operating providers.  
 
In the early 1990s, the financial autonomy of the social housing providers was restored, with the 
state buying off future subsidies in exchange for scrapping all outstanding loans. At the same 
time, regulatory constraints on their room for manoeuvre were relaxed. Nonetheless, the 
providers are still expected to fulfil their traditional function of affording housing for low-income 
families and people with special needs. In exchange for this, they retain a number of privileges 
such as tax exemptions (though these have been partially lifted). Since part of their capital has 
been accumulated through past subsidies, and as they have the responsibility to carry out public 
duties, the providers are subject to government supervision.  
 
The shape of performance measurement 
Within the governance system of Dutch social housing, formal supervision rests with the 
Ministry of Housing, but the system of performance measurement operates on two tiers. At the 
national level, the government has laid down a number of broad standards within the Besluit 
Beheer Sociale Huursector, the act outlining the basic rules of the game to which social housing 
providers have to submit. These standards amount to the following: 
 
I. Maintaining the quality of the social housing stock; 
II. Preferential treatment for low-income households; 
III. Encouraging combinations of housing and health care for the elderly; 
IV. Maintaining the social and physical quality of the housing environment; 
V. Giving voice to tenants in organisational decision-making.  
 
It is evident that these are rather broad standards. In practice, there are many ways in which they 
can be interpreted. In fact, it is even desirable that there should be a wide variety of 
interpretations. The housing market is divided into various local and regional submarkets, each 
different in terms of the demographic and socio-economic composition of the population, urban 
density, the size and composition of existing housing stock, the scope for expansion, and the 
portfolio and financial soundness of the individual housing providers operating within the 
submarket. To define detailed performance criteria for all providers concerned would be 
meaningless; to define them separately for each provider or group of providers would require a 
huge amount of information about local conditions. It is for this reason that the specification of 
targets has been decentralised to the local level. Local authorities, or groups of local authorities 
within a region, agree on contracts with social housing providers (usually collectively, with 
specifications for each organisation). Sometimes, other parties such as tenant organisations are 
included in the negotiations. The Ministry of Housing strongly encourages detailed contracts, 
though neither the content nor the level of detail are officially specified. It is hoped that local 
knowledge and priorities will lead to the development of generally accepted and tailor-made 
performance criteria.  
 
In addition to this formal system of performance measurement, there are a number of self-
regulatory methods through which social housing providers measure their own performance, 
notably benchmarking and peer review procedures. While these partly focus on other criteria, e.g. 
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relating to internal organisational matters, there is an overlap with the official system of 
performance measurement. The development of these instruments is still at an early stage, 
though, and participation in their use has not (yet) been adopted as membership policy by the 
national association of social housing providers Aedes.  
 
Performance measurement in practice 
There are two basic problems associated with this elaborate system of performance measurement. 
The first concerns the specification of performance, the second the relations between the various 
instruments involved.  
 
To begin with, there is no general consensus over how performance should be measured, not just 
in terms of indicators, but also in terms of values and scope. What with the expansion of non-
landlord activities, housing providers are increasingly defining their task more widely than 
simply providing a roof. For example, they also invest in activities relating to community 
building, lifestyles and empowerment. Since they have a great deal of money at their disposal, 
their willingness to invest in other types of activities has been greeted heartily by other local 
organisations. However, the diversity and fuzziness of the scope of their tasks complicate 
performance measurement greatly. At present, many areas of activity covered by performance 
contracts are left vague and unspecified. In such general terms, of course, it is easy enough to 
agree on the criteria that social housing providers should meet. They should invest in good 
housing, help disadvantaged groups, invest in neighbourhoods, develop housing for the elderly, 
and so forth. The difficulty is in the combination of the criteria, in determining how much effort 
in one type of activity can be offset against another, and the development of specified indicators.   
 
A further problem is that it is not clear how exactly the different instruments of performance 
measurement are related. There are two basic areas of tension. The first concerns the role of 
formal supervision in relation to local performance contracts. When a contract is set up between 
municipalities and housing providers, it is formally a matter of private law. In case of 
transgressions, there is the formal possibility of recourse to the legal system (though in practice 
this never occurs). Alternatively, transgressions can be reported to the Inspection, which can in 
turn ask the Minister of Housing to impose sanctions. This sometimes does happen, but only 
rarely. There is a theoretical clash of sanctioning instruments here, which is never realised. There 
is a real problem here, though. The performance contracts are not subject to prior approval by the 
Inspection, as they are of a private nature and involve municipal authorities over which the 
Inspection has no jurisdiction. This can put the latter in a difficult position, When contracts are 
left vague and unspecified, without detailed indicators, the Inspection is left with little to 
supervise, nor can it formally press for elaboration of the contracts. In practice, it mostly lobbies 
behind the scenes.  
 
Another area of tension involves legal (vertical) rules and self-imposed (horizontal) regulation. 
Although there have been some moves by the Ministry in a more hierarchical direction, there 
remains an institutional gap concerning specifications of performance. Hierarchical regulation is 
mostly “negative”, in that it only prevents certain activities from being undertaken. Positive 
indicators that allow organisational learning and competition between providers are mostly 
developed by the organisations themselves and by their branch association, but the status of such 
instruments is hanging in the air. At present, they are not tightly coupled to any system of 
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rewards or sanctions, which means their function is largely internal. The matter is complicated 
further by the existence of competing self-regulation instruments, since providers do not yet 
agree among themselves which are the proper instruments. 
 
The root of the problems is disagreement over prevalent co-ordination mechanisms, and 
ultimately, what is the nature of the housing providers. In this quasi-market type of governance 
system, the market is obviously a key method for bringing supply and demand together. In that 
sense, providers are businesses, a point they themselves stress to underpin their claim to self-
regulation. Their historical status as private non-profits provides further fuel for this claim and 
protects them from the direct interventions that public bodies could be subject to. However, given 
that the housing market functions imperfectly, that part of the capital held by providers is of 
public origin, and that certain public criteria have to be met, there is also a strong case for strong 
and continued public regulation and performance measurement. It is unclear to what extent 
benchmarks, peer reviews and contracts should be used for the purpose of learning, of 
assessment, or sanctioning.    
 
Conclusion 
The problems in defining specific indicators appear to have less to do with the nature of the 
products and services than with the diverse claims and balanced powers of the parties involved. 
Discussions over performance measurement instruments are vehicles for the more fundamental 
discussion over responsibilities and levels of autonomy within the present governance system. 
Another way in which this translates itself is in assessments of the levels of investment providers 
are financially capable of while safeguarding their long-term continuity. This is a situation in 
which failure to develop suitable indicators regarding public tasks cannot be ascribed (only) to 
information problems, but must also be attributed to a lack of agreement on the functions of 
performance measurement, and fear on how other actors might use the information it produces.   
 
 
6 Benchmarking home care: between transparency and secrecy 
 
Introduction 
In the last decade the Dutch health care system has been reformed drastically. In the early 
nineties a quasi-market replaced the traditional system in which suppliers received public or 
insurance money for a previously negotiated supply of (medical) care. The introduction of market 
activity in the health care sector was based on the assumption that regulated competition among 
health care providers and insurers would create a system of financial incentives. The need to 
compete with other providers and insurers would cause them to have an interest in better 
efficiency. In the home care sector the introduction of market activity has been an incremental 
process.   
 
Home care is regarded to be a basic health provision in the Dutch health care system. It consists 
of home help, community nursing and maternity care. About 70 million hours of community 
nursing and home help is provided to about two million clients yearly.6 The Dutch government 
considers the provision of home care to be insurable by private insurers or Medicaid. For that 
reason community nursing and home help are included in the General Act on Exceptional 
Medical Expenses (AWBZ). The home care entitlement traditionally was executed by an 
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authorised (recognised) home care organisation. In 1994 these organisations for the first time had 
to compete with private home care providers. To some extent the “regular” providers responded 
to this incentive by increasing their efficiency. However, it also caused a wave of amalgamations 
and alliances that largely offset competition. The introduction of new competitors therefore did 
not create the expected financial incentives (cf. Breedveld, 2003). 
 
 The entrance of private providers on the home care market also had some other unintended side 
effects. To begin with, the private providers only offered their services to lucrative clients, 
burdening the regular providers with the less profitable clients. Because of this “unfair" 
competition several regular home care organisations encountered financial problems. Secondly, 
the policy reform encouraged home care providers to pursue a market-oriented strategy. But a 
number of them seemed to reduce costs at the expense of the quality of care. Thirdly, some of the 
regular home care organisations started a private service branch, which among other things 
diminished the transparency of the use of public funding. The Dutch government responded to 
these unintended side effects by bringing the reform to a temporary halt.  However, in recent 
years competition is brought back to the scene. In 1998 the ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sports (VWS) decided to transform the supply-side funded health care system into a demand-side 
funded system. It is expected this will empower health care consumers, which in turn will induce 
suppliers of (medical) care to better efficiency and higher quality of care. In the Beleidsagenda 
2004 (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 2003: 17) this line of policy is refined 
and broken down into various actions that should improve the performances of insurers and care 
suppliers, e.g. more competition among insurers, and performance measurement by means of 
benchmarking.  
 
The shape of performance measurement: benchmarking  
Benchmarking is considered a suitable instrument to enable citizens, governmental agencies or 
other stakeholders to form an opinion about whether they receive “value for money”. The 
introduction of competition in the home care sector raised a need for transparency regarding the 
efficient and proper use of public money. Almost all home care organisations receiving public 
funding were affiliated to the National Association for Community Nursing and Home Help 
(LVT). This branch organisation arranged home care benchmarking, which is financed by the 
ministry of VWS.1 The branch organisation and the ministry of VWS together called in a large 
firm of consultants to perform the benchmarking. The results regarding the efficiency and quality 
of home care provision have been submitted to them on an aggregated level. In addition to that 
the consultants informed the home care organisations that were subject of the benchmark on their 
individual level of performance. Although the Dutch government was financially involved, it did 
not enforce performance measurement regulation. This allowed the LVT to act at its own 
discretion. As a consequence the focus of benchmarking gradually shifted from an accounting 
instrument into a tool to orchestrate organisational learning.  
 
After a pilot in 1997 the first integral benchmark arranged by the LVT took place in 1999. 
Considering the doubts regarding the spending of public funding and the financial problems of 
some of the regular home care organisations, it will hardly surprise that the pilot entirely focused 
on the expenditures and production of home care providers. The benchmark functioned as an 
                                                 
1 Landelijke Vereniging Thuiszorg: baanbreker in prestatie-indicatoren, http://zorgaanzet.nl/opinie, 28-01-2003. 
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instrument to account for the use of public money. However, the renewed competition in the 
home care sector soon induced the LVT to broaden the scope of the next benchmark. Instead of a 
single focus on efficiency - in terms of putting public money to good use – the benchmark was 
used to compare individual performances. It was hoped for that this would stimulate home care 
organisations to improve their efficiency and quality of care. Accordingly, the first integral 
benchmark not only concentrated on expenditure and production but also looked into client and 
professional satisfaction.  
 
In 2002 the second integral benchmark took place. Compared to the first integral benchmark its 
successor gave a more refined representation of the performances of home care organisations. 
Moreover, the LVT hoped to gain insight into best practices by linking the performances to the 
way in which the organisations provide care, but it turned out that there was no significant 
correlation. The LVT now tries to find out what goals members that perform best set and how 
they achieve these goals, which is reflected in the main function of the benchmark. On its website 
the LVT defines the benchmark as: “a continuous systematic process for measuring costs and 
quality of products and services, and selecting best practices for the purpose of organizational 
improvement”.7 By relating outcomes to processes the LVT wants to pinpoint “performance 
indicators”. In this way it hopes to offer its members not only insight in their individual level of 
performance but also an understanding of the way in which they can improves themselves. Those 
LVT-members that achieve the best performances based on a combined evaluation covering 
aspects of efficiency and quality will be identified as “best practices”. These best practices serve 
as a tool for identifying points in respect of which LVT-members can improve their 
performances. In the end the LVT strives at an integration of performance indicators. This shows 
that the main function of the benchmark has changed over time: it turned from a tool to improve 
transparency into an instrument to orchestrate organisational learning. 
 
Consequences of the change toward organisational learning 
How does the change in the design of the benchmark affect the transparency that is required on a 
successful quasi-market? The main concern of branch organisations is to lobby and to protect 
their member’s interests. Accordingly the branch organisation and its members use the results of 
the benchmarks to consolidate their position in a quasi-market. We therefore may expect that the 
changed function of the benchmark - from a tool to improve transparency into an instrument to 
orchestrate organisational learning - will affect the chances of stakeholders to form an opinion 
about whether they receive “value for money”. The benchmark will be used as an accounting 
instrument only when the results prove that their members stand out in some specific part of 
service provision, for example the high rating of LVT-members on client satisfaction. Moreover, 
when future benchmarks reveal how best practices are linked to the process of care provision a 
further closure of information is likely. As the ministry of VWS will not be financially involved 
in the next benchmark, which is scheduled for 2005, the results of the benchmark will come 
exclusively into the possession of the branch organisation and its members. Their emphasis on 
the learning from best practises will reduce their willingness to share the results with “outsiders”. 
After all, the more transparency the easier best practices can be copied by competitors and the 




When a benchmark model is designed to orchestrate organisational learning, the willingness to 
share the results with stakeholders diminishes. They will be informed only when this is profitable 
from the point of view of those who commissioned the benchmark. Complete openness about the 
results may conflict with a market strategy that aims at learning from best practises in order to 
distinguish oneself from competitors. We conclude from this that benchmarking is less 
appropriate to increase transparency when it is used primarily as an instrument to facilitate 
improvement of performances and less as an accounting instrument.  
 
    
7 Analysis and conclusions 
 
The four cases show that the official functions of performance measurement tools are frequently 
not realised. Though in two cases (disability + home care) a certain level of transparency was 
achieved, none of the cases showed clear examples of assessment and/or sanctioning, although 
these were the formally intended functions of the performance measurement tools. Yet to refer to 
these developments as “unintended consequences” would be confusing, because they are not 
unintended, but different than originally and/or formally intended.  
 
A more suitable terminology comes from a classic article by Robert Merton, in which he argued 
that functional analysis must keep its distance from the subjective intentions of actors in social 
systems: functional analysis is about “objective consequences” (Merton, 1949). However, he also 
recognised that many scholars in the field were unable to explain the functioning of social 
systems without reference to the motivations of the participants in the system. Therefore, Merton 
suggested distinguishing between manifest and latent functions, the first referring to the obvious 
and intended functions of elements in a system, the latter to functions that are not overtly 
intended or recognised. A governance system, including its performance measurement 
instruments, has intended (manifest) functions, recognised by its designers; in its actual 
functioning it may provoke unintended consequences (for instance due to information 
asymmetries) and it may develop new (latent) functions that were not thought of beforehand. 
 
As the cases show, some of these latent functions are especially functional to the goals of some 
particular participants in the system, rather than to the over-all system’s purposes, and must in 
some cases be considered dysfunctional. We distinguish four such functions.   
 
Politicisation  
Once performance measurement has been established, as in the disability case, actors may start 
challenging various aspects of the system, such as indicators. Although this might look like a 
technical debate on the feasibility of the methods involved, it may actually be the result of 
fundamental objections against the governance system and its distribution of institutional 
responsibilities. In an audit culture, performance measurement discourse may have become the 
natural way to express particular political and administrative interests. Or, in the vocabulary of 
Michel Foucault, questions of “governmentality” are increasingly raised in terms such as “visible 
results” and “opportunities for inspection”. 
 
Regaining public control  
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Reforms inspired by NPM usually involve a withdrawal of direct bureaucratic control over the 
implementation of public policy, as was the case in Dutch social housing. Yet, if the results of 
reform are disappointing in this respect, the point of no return may have been passed, in the sense 
that the formal institutional structure cannot be restored without great difficulty. Performance 
management tools may then be used in an effort to re-introduce public aims on the agenda of 
relevant actors in the field, for example, through “contractual relationships” between public 
authorities and autonomous agencies, as an. This might be labelled a case of “principals in search 
for agents”.  
 
Masking failures 
Institutional reforms do not necessarily result in transparent, unambiguous governance systems. 
As the case of municipal labour reintegration showed, system designers may combine elements 
of quasi-markets, outsourcing, bureaucratic control and interorganisational co-operation within a 
single structure, without much reflection on its coherence. The ambiguity with respect to 
institutional responsibilities and achievements may lead to urgent calls for (better) performance 
measurement tools. At the same time, however, the ambiguity of the governance system will not 
allow for an effective use of these tools. In cases like this, such tools are adopted from the 
institutional environment, as a “ rationalised myth” that contributes to the suggestion of effective 
governance (cf. Meyer & Rowan 1977).  
 
Disruption of institutional logic 
The case of home care provision showed that private providers in a quasi-market may have 
incentives to hide relevant information, to prefer secrecy over transparency, and to defy or by-
pass institutional pressures towards “objective information services”  (cf. Oliver 1991). This is 
typical of “regular” markets, but it means that performance measurement, when left in the hands 
of the providers themselves, becomes a learning tool rather an instrument of accountability. The 
kind of transparancy required by the public aspect of the system clashes with the need for 
intransparancy on the part of providers.  
 
In these cases the failure to realise the manifest functions of performance measurement is not the 
result of technical problems, but of the ambiguity, imperfection and hybridity of the newly 
developed governance systems. Performance measurement tools and discourse seem to have 
developed into the vehicles by which these systems are changed and challenged, irrespective of 
evidence regarding the actual success or failure of the tools. No doubt, the birth of the “ audit 
society” is closely related to the emergence of NPM, but its diffusion and continuation is also 
propelled by the tendency of performance measurement tools to take on latent functions.  
 
Of course, our effort has only signalled this aspect of performance measurement. Further 
comparative research in other sectors and countries would provide a far richer picture of the 
latent functions of performance measurement allowing a more systematic typology of these 
functions in relation to particular features of governance systems. In this context, it would be 
useful to shift more attention to the organisational level and to concentrate on the different 
dynamics behind the emergence of functions and dysfunctions. It also seems desirable to improve 
our understanding of the ways in which principal-agent and institutional arguments relate to each 
other. The former tends to focus on manifest functions and, as a result, emphasizes the risks 
caused by information asymmetries. The latter concentrates on latent functions following from 
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institutional dynamics. One may have to reflect not only on current applications of the principal-
agent concept, but also on its applicability in governance systems characterised by increasing 
multiplicity and ambiguity.   
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1 In Dutch: Wet Voorzieningen Gehandicapten (Wvg). 
2 The macro-budget can be defined as the national budget that is available for service provision to disabled, before it is allocated 
to municipalities. 
3 This scan includes questions about the number of applications, number of allocated facilities, percentage applications that is 
permitted, costs of facilities and costs of implementation (SGBO, 2003). 
4 In Dutch: Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG). 
5 For example, in 2002 20% of the municipalities did not participate in the scan research (SGBO, 2003: 2). 
6 Community nursing and home help is a collective term for a number of divergent functions and services that are provided in the 
home situation. 
7 http://www.thuiszorg.nl/docs/final_orlando.pdf 
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